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Abstract:
Purpose: The purpose of  this paper is to set up the coordinating mechanism for a
decentralized distribution system consisting of  a manufacturer and multiple independent
retailers by means of  contracts. It is in the two-stage supply chain system that all retailers sell an
identical product made by the manufacturer and determine their order quantities which directly
affect the expected profit of  the supply chain with random demand.
Design/methodology/approach: First comparison of  the optimal order quantities in the
centralized and decentralized system shows that the supply chain needs coordination. Then the
coordination model is given based on buyback cost and compensation benefit. Finally the
coordination mechanism is set up in which the manufacturer as the leader uses a buyback policy
to incentive these retailers and the retailers pay profit returns to compensate the manufacturer.
Findings: The results of  a numerical example show that the perfect supply chain coordination
and the flexible allocation of  the profit can be achieved in the multi-retailer supply chain by the
buyback and compensation contracts.
Research limitations: The results based on assumptions might not completely hold in practice
and the paper only focuses on studying a single product in two-stage supply chain. 
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Practical implications: The coordination mechanism is applicable to a realistic supply chain
under a private information setting and the research results is the foundation of  further
developing the coordination mechanism for a realistic multi-stage supply chain system with
more products.
Originality/value: This paper focused on studying the coordination mechanism for a
decentralized multi-retailer supply chain by the joint application of  the buyback and
compensation contracts. Furthermore the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible
allocation of  the profit are achieved.
Keywords: supply chain management, coordination model, compensation, buyback policy 
1. Introduction
Supply chain management seems to be a growing area of interest amongst researchers and
practitioners from varied disciplines. Coordination is a central lever of supply chain
management (Ballou, Gilbert & Mukherjee, 2000) and the essence of the coordination is to
design an effective incentive mechanism which makes the members of supply chain achieve
the total optimization in the process of independent decisions (Anderson & Lee, 1999). Zimmer
set up coordination mechanisms by the ways of two incentive schemes about penalty cost and
bonus combined with order quantity respectively, and works out the optimal combined value
with order quantity and bonus and with order quantity and bonus (Zimmer, 2002).
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) proposed a model of a supply chain contract based on
the revenue sharing mechanism and this model allowed the system efficiency to be achieved
as well as it could improve the profits of all the SC actors by tuning the contract parameters
(Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004). Cachon and Lariviere (2005) showed that buyback
contracts and revenue-sharing contracts are equivalent in the fixed-price newsvendor model.
For any buyback contract, there exists a revenue-sharing contract that generates the same
cash flows for any realization of demand. However, this is not the case when demand is price-
dependent (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). Yao et al. showed that a profit sharing contract could
coordinate a decentralized supply chain in the same way as a buyback contract (Yao, Chen &
Yan, 2007). Shin and Benton developed a quantity discount model that resolved the practical
challenges associated with implementing quantity discount policies for supply chain
coordination between a supplier and a buyer (Shin & Benton, 2007). Chen et al. proposed a
three-parameter risk and profit sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain (Chen, Chen,
Chiu, Choi & Sethi, 2010). Jing et al. investigated a decentralized supply chain that consists of
a manufacturer and a retailer where the retailer simultaneously determines the retail price and
order quantity while experiencing customer returns and price dependent stochastic demand
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and proposed an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer that includes two
buyback prices (Jing & Peter, 2011). Omkar et al. demonstrated that using revenue-dependent
the revenue sharing contracts supply chains could be coordinated while providing positive
surplus to the supply chain players that is otherwise not possible under certain situations in
revenue –independent contracts (Omkar & Palsule,2013). Shibaji explored coordination of a
corporate social responsible manufacturer-retailer chain by setting revenue sharing contract
(Shibaji, 2014).
In recent years, researchers have not only given considerable attention to the production flow
synchronization of the single-vendor and single- buyer integrated inventory supply chain but
also paid more attention to the synchronization of the single-vendor and multi-buyer case
(Hoque, 2008; Yan, 2011; Liu, 2007; Palut & Ulengin, 2011; Cao, Wan & Lai, 2013). Ozen,
Sosic and Slikker (2012) focused on coordination of the manufacturer and the retailers through
buy-back contracts and prove buy–back contracts, in general, couldn’t make the distribution
system achieve the same performance as the centralized system (Ozen et al., 2012). Wu et al.
studied supply chain system consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers when the demand
function and cost were disrupted simultaneously, and presented a revenue sharing contract to
realize anti-disruption (Wu & Yang, 2010; Cao & Lai, 2010).
Based on these literatures this paper considered a decentralized two-stage supply chain
consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, in which all retailers sold an
identical product made by the manufacturer and determined their order quantities. The optimal
order quantities in the centralized and decentralized system were compared and gave the
coordination necessity for the supply chain. Then the coordination mechanism was set up in
which the manufacturer as the leader uses a buyback policy to incentive these retailers and
the retailers pay profit returns to compensate the manufacturer. Compared with the above
mentioned literatures, it is by the buyback and compensation contracts that not only the
perfect supply chain coordination but also the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved in
the multi-retailer supply chain in this paper.
The paper was organized as follows. In section 2, the basic model was discussed and the profit
functions of the manufacturer and the retailer are presented. In section 3 two extreme cases
of the decentralized and centralized systems are given to evaluate the coordination
mechanisms in the following sections. Section 4 developed the coordination mechanism based
on the buyback and compensation contracts. In section 5, a numerical example was given. The
paper was concluded in Section 6.
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2. The Basic Model
Here consider a decentralized two-stage supply chain with a manufacturer and multiple
retailers in a one-period setting. The manufacturer as the leader in the system produces and
sells an identical product for the retailers at the same wholesale price. All the retailers face
stochastic customer demand and have to determine his stocking quantities, which he orders
from the manufacturer, at the beginning of a selling period. When placing their order, the
retailers don’t know exact demand realization but know the distribution of the demand. After
the manufacturer shipped the goods to all the retailers and the retailers begin to sell the goods
for the customers, the demand for every retailer is realized. If the ordered amount is more
than the market demand so that the surplus products can not be sold at the end of the period,
the retailers would salvage any leftover inventory. If the ordered amount is less than the
external demand, the retailer needs to pay for the shortage cost.
2.1. The Manufacturer Model
We assume that the system contains n retailers based on the above description. Then the
manufacturer's actual profit with the decentralized decision situation is
(1)
Notations
M: Profit for the manufacturer 
qi: Order quantity for retailer i
c: Production cost per unit for the manufacturer
w: Wholesale price per unit
ti: Transportation cost per unit from the manufacturer to retailer i, not including purchasing
cost.
2.2. The Retailer’s Model
At the end of a selling period the actual profit for retailer is
(2)
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Where .
Notations
: Profit for retailer i
pi: Selling price per unit for retailer i
si: Salvage cost per unit for retailer i
πi: Shortage value per unit for retailer i
ri: Market demand for retailer i
When the demand distribution F(ri) and the density function f(ri) for retailer i are known, the
expected profit for retailer i is given by
(3)
3. The Coordination Necessity Analysis 
3.1. The Decentralized Decision 
In a decentralized supply chain system, each retailer tries to optimize his own entity and the
manufacturer does likewise. The manufacturer as the leader determines the wholesale price w
according to the market supply and demand, and the retailers as the followers determine their
optimal order quantities qiopt which achieves maximal expected profit according to the
manufacturer’s decision.
Firstly, the first derivative of the function  on the order quantity qi according to
Equation 3 is solved by
(4)
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Then the second derivative of the function  on the order quantity qi according to
Equation 4 is solved by
(5)
Because the salvage cost for retailer i must be less than the selling price for retailer i, viz. pi  si,
and f(qi)  0, the expected profit for retailer i  must have maximum value. Then let the
first derivative of the function  on the order quantity qi equal zero, viz. , and
the optimal order quantity qiopt can be solved by
(6)
3.2. The Centralized Decision 
In the centralized system, there is a single maker who tries to optimize the overall supply
chain and the optimal decision which can allow the supply chain system to achieve the
maximal overall expected profit is determined as a joint optimal problem.
So the actual total profit of the supply chain is given by
(7)
Where h stands for the unit price that the manufacturer handles with the unsold products at
the end of the period.
When the demand distribution F(ri) and the density function f(ri) for all the retailers are known,
the expected total profit for the supply chain E(TC) is given by
(8)
Based on Equation 8, the first partial derivative of the function E(TC) on the order quantity qi
for retailer i is solved by
    
(9)
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Then the second partial derivative of the function E(TC) on the order quantity qi according to
Equation 9 is solved by
(10)
Obviously, the same with the decentralized decision situation, viz. , which shows
that the function E(TC) must have maximum value. Then let the first derivative of the function
E(TC) on the order quantity qi equal zero, viz. , and the optimal order quantity
 with centralized decision situation can be solved by,
(11)
3.3. The Coordination Necessity 
Comparing Equation 6 with Equation 11, it is known that the wholesale price charged the
manufacturer is more higher than the sum of production cost and transportation cost, i.e.
w > c + ti, and si  max{si, h – ti}. At the same time the demand distribution function F(ri) is an
increasing function. Therefore, the more order quantity with centralized decision scenario will
be placed by every retailer than with decentralized decision scenario. In addition, the expected
profit of the supply chain mainly depends on the order quantity of the retailers and increases
with improving the order quantity. From that it can be deduced that the centralized decision
will leads to a higher total profit for the entire supply chain.
Therefore in order to allow the decentralized system to achieve the same performance as a
centralized supply chain and make the retailers actively participate in cooperation, the
manufacturer as the leader in supply chain needs to set up a coordination mechanism based
on contracts to ensure that the expected profit for the retailers will be higher than with the
decentralized decision situation.
4. The Coordination Mechanism 
In general, salvaging at the manufacturer is more beneficial than salvaging at the retailer
because the manufacturer might redirect the unsold or not-needed units to this market and
gain the positive revenue. In order to allow the decentralized system to achieve the same
performance as a centralized supply chain, the manufacturer as the leader of the game should
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buy back the unsold products for every retailer at the end of period. But only buyback
contract, in general, cannot make the distribution system achieve the same performance as
the centralized system (Ozen et al., 2012). Therefore the manufacturer should guide the
retailers to give up opposition in the buyback process to achieve revenue sharing through the
compensation contract.
Here introduces incentive functions consisting of buyback cost and compensation benefit, that
is
(12)
Where ki(qi – ri) is the cost that the manufacturer buys back the unsold units for retailer i and
ki stands for buyback cost per unit, Ai stands for the compensation benefit that retailer i pays
for the manufacturer. 
The actual profit of the manufacturer and retailer i after introducing the incentive function is
given by
(13)
(14)
The two objective functions above show that the incentive function has only an indirect impact
on the total cost of the supply chain, because in the functions  the expenditures
of the manufacturer  and the receipts of all the retailers 
cancel each other out.
When the distribution of the demand F(ri) for all the retailers is known, the expected profit of
the manufacturer and retailer i are given by
(15)
(16)
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According to Equation 14 solving the first partial derivative of the function  on the order
quantity qi and letting it equal zero, retailer i determines the optimal order quantity  that
achieves maximal expected profit. The optimal order quantity can be calculated solving the
following equation,
(17)
Assume that the buy-back price ki and compensation benefit Ai decisions of the manufacturer
and the retailers aim to achieve the higher total profit of the supply chain. To ensure that all
the retailer chooses this value of order quantity that incurs overall maximal expected total
profit, the manufacturer must fix the buy-back cost ki and compensation benefit Ai so that the
following equation holds:
(18)
Assume the special case that the random variable ri follows a uniform distribution over the
range [ri1, ri2], the optimal buy-back cost ki as a function of compensation benefit Ai for retailer
i is attained by solving Equation 18:
(19)
Each combination of the buy-back cost ki and the compensation benefit Ai that satisfies the
above equation ensures that all the retailers choose the overall optimal order policy that leads
to maximal expected total profit of the entire supply chain. 
In order to make the parties of the supply chain agree to such a collaboration model, after
introducing the incentive methods the expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailers
should be more than that with supply chain decentralized decision situation which require to
fulfill the constraints as follow,
(20)
So far, it have been developed that collaboration mechanisms that gain an overall optimal
performance of the entire supply chain.
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5. Numerical Examples 
Here consider a supply chain with a manufacturer and two independent retailers. All
parameters are specified randomly while creating the data set and the data set is satisfied with
parameters constraints in the models above. Let w = 1000, c = 300, h = 600, t1 = 50, t2 = 30,
p1 = 1500, p2 = 1400, π1 = 1200, π2 = 1000, s1 = 500, s2 = 450. Assume that the market demand of
two retailers follow a uniform distribution, viz. r1  [100, 200] and r2  [200, 300]. Thus the
continuous probability distributions of two retailers are respectively attained by
(21)
(22)
Substituting the density functions (21) and (22) in Equation 6, the optimal order quantities of
two retailers in supply chain decentralized decision scenario can be respectively determined to
be 
(23)
(24)
After that, the optimal order quantity q1opt is 177 units and q2opt is 272 units. Based on the
optimal order quantities solved the actual profit of the manufacturer is M = 297290 (see
Equation 1), the expected profits of two retailer are respectively  = 55681 and 
= 80256 (see Equation 3). Then the expected total profit for the entire supply chain can be
calculated, viz. E(T) = 433227. On the other hand, the optimal order quantities of two
retailers in centralized decision scenario are respectively  = 209 and  =317 units (see
Equation 11), which achieves maximal expected profit for the entire supply chain, that is
E(TC) = 467880 (see Equation 8). The results are summarized in Table 1, which shows the
expected total profit of the entire supply chain in supply chain centralized decision scenario is
more than in supply chain decentralized decision scenario. Therefore, it is necessary to set up
coordination mechanism to increase the total profit of the entire supply chain.
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Parameters q1opt q2opt M E(S1) E(S2) E(T)
Decentralized decision 177 272 297290 55681 80256 433227
Centralized decision 209 317 – – – 467880
Table 1. Decentralized Decision Compared with Centralized Decision
Firstly, according to Equation 19 the optimal buy-back cost ki as a function of compensation
benefit Ai for retailer i is
(25)
(26)
Then according to Equation 20 the solved constraints are
(27)
Furthermore according to Equation 15 and Equation 16 the range of compensation benefit A1
and A2, which two retailers pays for the manufacturer, are determined by
A1  28090, A1  19229, and A1 + A2  15468
Finally in the range of allowable compensation benefit the optimal combination values about
the buy-back cost and compensation benefit are given in Table 2.
A1 A2 k1 k2 E(Mh) E(S1h) E(S2h) E(Th)
18000 19200 980 992 331796 55820 80264 467880
16000 18000 998 1003 326797 58882 82201 467880
12000 15000 1034 1028 315998 65006 86876 467880
9000 12000 1062 1056 308470 67658 91752 467880
Table 2. Optimal Combination Values about Buy-back Cost and Compensation Benefit
Table 2 indicates that the optimal combination values about the buy-back cost and
compensation benefit in the range of allowable compensation benefit not only allows the
expected total profit for the supply chain with the decentralized decision is same as with the
centralized decision but also makes two retailers in supply chain have the higher expected
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profit than the initial expected profit and the manufacturer has no lower expected profit than
the profit with the decentralized solution. Final determination on the buy-back cost and
compensation benefit depends on their negotiation to realize revenue sharing. Generally, the
manufacturer as the leader maintains the principle of making the retailers willing to cooperate
and achieving maximum self-profit.
6. Conclusions 
The paper considers a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and
multiple independent retailers. All retailers sell an identical product made by the manufacturer
and determine their order quantities which directly affect the expected profit of the supply
chain. First we compares the decentralized system, where no information exchange among the
parties takes place, with the centralized system, where all decisions could be chosen
simultaneously by the manufacturer, and comparison result shows that the expected total
profit of the entire supply chain with the decentralized decision is always lower than the
centralized decision. Therefore it is necessary for the decentralized distribution supply chain to
set up the coordination mechanism to perform as well as the centralized one. 
Then the coordination mechanism is given in which the manufacturer as the leader of the
game, on the one hand, buys back the unsold products for every retailer at the end of period
to incentive these retailers, on the other hand, guides the retailers to give up opposition in the
buyback process to achieve revenue sharing through the compensation contract. Finally, the
results of a numerical example show that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible
allocation of the profit can be achieved in the multi-retailer decentralized distribution supply
chain by the buyback and compensation contracts.
The paper might have some limitations. First the results based on assumptions might not
completely hold in practice. But it can be shown that the coordination mechanism is also
applicable to a realistic supply chain under a private information setting. Second the paper only
focuses on studying a single product in two-stage supply chain. Thus it would be worth
developing such the coordination mechanism for the multi-stage supply chain system with
more products.
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